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CRAFTING A LICENSE TO KNOW FROM A PRIVILEGE
TO ACCESS
Jane K. Winn*
Should the doctrine of trespass to chattels1 apply to unauthorized
access to Internet facilities? If it does, then the property rights of the
owners of computers connected to the Internet may be vindicated, but at
a cost of diminished public access to information posted on the Internet.
If it does not, then incentives to invest in the kind of commercial
facilities that now largely constitute the Internet may be undermined, but
the public interest in knowledge gleaned from information posted on the
Internet will be protected. Although trespass to chattels has been derided
as an anachronism ill-suited to the Internet,2 and its application to
Internet activities rejected in some recent cases,3 other cases have held
decisively that its application gives appropriate recognition to the rights
of owners of computer equipment connected to the Internet.4 In order to
* Director and Professor, Shidler Center for Law, Commerce & Technology, University of
Washington School of Law. Thanks to William Edmundson, Brad Handler, and Jay Monahan for
helpful comments.
1. Trespass to chattels is defined as the unauthorized, intentional, and substantial use of or
intermeddling with another’s tangible personal property. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 217–218 (1965).
2. “Trespass to chattels is somewhat arcane and suffers from desuetude.” Intel Corp. v. Hamidi,
114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244, 247 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), rev’d, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003). Many academic
commentators have criticized the application of trespass to chattels doctrine to the Internet. See, e.g.,
Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 27 (2000); Edward W.
Chang, Bidding on Trespass: eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc. and the Abuse of Trespass Theory in
Cyberspace Law, 29 AIPLA Q.J. 445 (2001); Niva Elkin-Koren, Let the Crawlers Crawl: On
Virtual Gatekeepers and the Right To Exclude Indexing, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 179 (2001); Dan
Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439
(2003); Michael J. Madison, Rights of Access and the Shape of the Internet, 44 B.C. L. REV. 433
(2003); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Property Rights and Competition on the Internet: In Search of an
Appropriate Analogy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 561 (2001); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Shaping
Competition on the Internet: Who Owns Product and Pricing Information?, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1965
(2000) [hereinafter O’Rourke, Shaping Competition]; Laura Quilter, The Continuing Expansion of
Cyberspace Trespass to Chattels, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 421 (2002).
3. See, e.g., Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV99-7654-HLH (VBKx), 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6483, at *12 (C.D. Cal. 2003); Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 300 (Cal. 2003).
4. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); eBay,
Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2000); CompuServe, Inc. v.
Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1017 (S.D. Ohio 1997). Some academic commentators
have applauded this trend. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (2003);
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safeguard the “license to know” factual information posted to the
Internet that the public currently enjoys, courts should recognize an
individual privilege to access Internet resources in a reasonable manner.
Given that trespass to chattels is unlikely to disappear from the
Internet landscape any time soon, refinements are needed to keep the
doctrine’s scope within reasonable bounds and to make its application
more predictable. The California Supreme Court recently imposed such
a limitation on its application by holding that liability for trespass should
be found only if the Internet access at issue significantly impairs the
functions of another’s computer equipment or, if widely replicated,
would so impair it.5 However, this attempt to restrict the scope of earlier
rulings may prove to be at least as contentious as the holdings of the
cases it purports to limit, and so is unlikely to staunch the flow of
controversy.
The California Supreme Court focused on the functional impact that
unauthorized access has on computer equipment owned by the party
objecting to the access. A more helpful refinement of trespass doctrine
might be found by considering instead which forms of access equipment
owners have consented to merely as a consequence of connecting their
equipment to the Internet. In every case in which trespass to chattels has
been raised as an issue, before filing suit the equipment owner had
demanded in no uncertain terms that the unauthorized access stop
immediately, so the accessing party obviously cannot rely on a defense
of express or implied consent. Courts could instead recognize a form of
“constructive” consent to certain reasonable forms of access6 that would
defeat a claim of trespass. While such a finding of “consent” would not
correspond to the actual subjective state of mind of the plaintiff bringing
a trespass to chattels claim, it would have the benefit of refocusing
attention on the social significance of the public character of the Internet,
and hold the owner of computer equipment connected to the Internet
accountable for having made the choice to create that connection.

Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217 (1996);
Richard Warner, Border Disputes: Trespass to Chattels on the Internet, 47 VILL. L. REV. 117
(2002); I. Trotter Hardy, The Ancient Doctrine of Trespass to Web Sites, 1996 J. ONLINE L. art. 7
(1996), at www.wm.edu/law/publications/jol/95_96/hardy.html.
5. Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 296, 306.
6. The California Supreme Court came close to doing this. Id. at 308 (“Intel connected its e-mail
system to the Internet and permitted its employees to make use of this connection both for business
and, to a reasonable extent, for their own purposes.”).
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One of the most significant problems created by the application of
trespass to chattels doctrine to unauthorized Internet access disputes is
its overbreadth. Trespass doctrine lacks the nuances normally found in
intellectual property law to balance competing public and private
interests in the exploitation of ideas and knowledge. Overbroad grants of
rights in information have a chilling effect on the progress of science and
the dissemination of knowledge generally.7 Trespass doctrine vindicates
the property rights of equipment owners at the expense of the “ease and
openness of communication”8 that has always been the hallmark of the
Internet. Overzealous application of trespass doctrine obscures the fact
that some forms of Internet access must be privileged if the unique
public character of the Internet is to be preserved. Such a privilege
should be limited in scope in recognition of the role played by private
parties in maintaining the Internet today. The recognition of this
privilege, however, should not be made contingent on the voluntary
acquiescence of private parties.
Recognizing a defense to a claim of trespass in Internet cases based
on a finding of constructive consent provides a doctrinal basis for
privileging some forms of access while acknowledging a right to exclude
certain other forms of access. Focusing attention on the public character
of the Internet and assigning a clear legal significance to the equipment
owner’s deliberate choice to participate in that arena provide a more
secure legal foundation for such a privilege to access than the
“functional impairment” standard offered by the California Supreme
Court. The contours of such a doctrine of constructive consent to
Internet access are suggested by the terms of the license eBay offered to
Bidder’s Edge as discussed below—access by individual Internet users
or its functional equivalent. This Article suggests that a defense based on
constructive consent can complement the limitation imposed by the
California Supreme Court to further limit the scope of trespass doctrine
in Internet arenas, increase the predictability of the doctrine’s application
in new disputes, and help to protect important public interests in free and
open access to Internet resources.

7. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50
VAND. L. REV. 51 (1997) (arguing that an intellectual property right in data will be harmful to
science and education if based on the labor expended in building the database instead of innovation
contained in the data).
8. Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 311.
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SETTING THE STAGE: EBAY, INC. V. BIDDER’S EDGE, INC.

The first case to apply the doctrine of trespass to chattels to modern
networked communication services involved the unauthorized use of
access codes to make long distance calls.9 That case held that teenagers
who hacked into a long-distance telephone service’s computer system
and made unauthorized long distance calls using access codes thus
obtained could be held liable for trespass to chattels.10 The chattels at
issue were the telephone access codes; the court declined to limit the
application of trespass to chattels doctrine to intangible interests that
were clearly associated with an interest in tangible property.11
The second case applying trespass to chattels to a modern networked
communication system involved Cyber Promotions using the facilities of
CompuServe, an Internet service provider (ISP), to send unsolicited
commercial email (also known as spam) to the ISP’s subscribers.12
CompuServe’s subscribers threatened to terminate their subscriptions
unless it could stop Cyber Promotions from spamming them, and
CompuServe undertook every technological measure at its disposal in a
fruitless attempt to block Cyber Promotions’ communications.13 The
court found that Cyber Promotions’ spamming constituted trespass to
chattels, the chattels in question being CompuServe’s computer
equipment, because the activity deprived CompuServe of the economic
value of the equipment even though it did not lose possession of it.14 The
court rejected the argument that Cyber Promotions’ access was
privileged because CompuServe had consented to receive spam
addressed to its subscribers, finding instead that whatever consent might
be inferred from connecting its equipment to the Internet had been
revoked by communications from CompuServe to Cyber Promotions.15
Perhaps the most well-known case to apply the theory of trespass to
chattels involved a conflict between eBay and Bidder’s Edge. eBay’s
primary business involves providing an Internet auction service that
permits individuals to offer items for sale and also to purchase items

9. Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
10. Id. at 473.
11. Id. at 473 n.6.
12. CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1018 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
13. Id. at 1019.
14. Id. at 1022.
15. Id. at 1024.
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posted for sale.16 eBay’s business model focuses on creating a
“community” of buyers and sellers; eBay does not itself offer for sale or
guarantee any of the products offered on its site. Amazon.com and
Yahoo! have similar auction sites, but eBay dominates the U.S. market
for Internet auction services.17 These Internet auction sites are designed
to give unrestricted access to individuals wishing to browse the items
offered for sale. To place an item for sale, or to bid on an item, it is
necessary to register with the auction site, and the registration process
requires individuals to manifest their assent to the auction site’s terms
and conditions of use.
A.

Auction Aggregators: Licensed and Unlicensed

During the exuberant days of the dot com bubble, public interest in
Internet auction sites such as eBay was exploding. A handful of dot com
entrepreneurs devised the “auction aggregator” business model to permit
individuals to search more than one Internet auction site simultaneously
and to learn at once which site offered the best deal. There are no
auction aggregators in operation today, but aggregators that once
captured quite a bit of attention included www.auctionwatch.com,
www.auctionferret.com, and www.auctionrover.com.
Given that eBay was the dominant player in the U.S. Internet auction
site then as well as now, it could be expected to have ambivalent feelings
about aggregator sites. Aggregators might increase the liquidity of
auction markets created by its competitors; however, to the extent that
eBay offered the largest selection and best prices, comparisons might
have only increased its advantage over its competitors. To the extent that
eBay’s sellers would gain access to a larger group of prospective buyers
through referrals from aggregators, however, they could be expected to
support the work of the aggregator sites.
Perhaps in order to accommodate the wishes of its sellers, eBay made
a practice of licensing to aggregators access to information about
auctions taking place on eBay’s site. These licenses were granted
subject to certain restrictions designed to minimize the demands placed
on eBay’s own system by the aggregators, and to guarantee the accuracy
16. In 2000, eBay acquired Half.com, which provides a marketplace for buyers and sellers with
fixed prices. In 2002, it acquired PayPal, the leading payment provider for Internet auction and
consumer-to-consumer transactions.
17. Troy Wolverton, At the Top of the Heap, eBay Still Must Look Down, THESTREET.COM, July
24, 2003, at http://www.thestreet.com/pf/stocks/troywolverton/10101844.html.
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of information being provided to aggregators’ customers.18 Aggregators
were authorized to provide comparisons to aggregator site end users,
provided that the demands they placed on eBay’s site were equivalent to
the demands that would have been placed on its systems if aggregators’
customers had visited eBay’s site directly. In other words, eBay would
only authorize aggregators to perform “real time proxy searches,” in
which a query would be submitted for one item at a time, and the current
price for that item would be provided to the aggregator’s end user
immediately. This type of proxy search both limited the demands that
aggregator sites placed on eBay’s servers and guaranteed that the
aggregator’s end user was provided with updated, accurate price
information.
Many aggregators were willing to live within these constraints,19 but
some, including Bidder’s Edge, were not.20 Bidder’s Edge’s business
model involved sending software robots (bots) onto eBay’s site once
every twenty-four hours to copy information about everything offered on
the site. This information was sent back to Bidder’s Edge and displayed
in response to Bidder’s Edge’s end users’ queries until another copy of
all the listing information on eBay was made the following day. eBay
objected both to the demands that the bots were placing on its system
when copying all the listing information at once, and to the fact that
Bidder’s Edge’s end users were often being shown inaccurate price
information. When Bidder’s Edge’s end users clicked through an eBay
listing only to find that the price had gone up since the Bidder’s Edge
copy of the data had been made, some of them blamed eBay for the
unexpected change in price. eBay was also concerned that Bidder’s
Edge’s wholesale approach to collecting data off its site might cause
eBay to fail to perform some of its undertakings under its privacy policy,
and might make it possible for Bidder’s Edge to reuse information about
“members” of the eBay community in ways that were expressly
prohibited under the eBay User Agreement.

18. E-mail from Jay Monahan, Vice President, eBay, Inc., to author (Sept. 23, 2003) (on file with
author).
19. Steven Bonisteel, Auction Aggregator Gets OK To Search eBay, NEWSBYTES, Dec. 1, 1999,
at http://www.exn.ca/Stories/1999/11/25/02.asp.
20. Auction
Conflict
Escalates,
WIRED
NEWS,
Oct.
11,
1999,
at
http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,31850,00.html; Steven Bonisteel, eBay’s Battle with
Auction
Aggregators
Heats
Up
Again,
NEWSBYTES,
Nov.
4,
1999,
at
http://www.exn.ca/Stories/1999/11/04/01.asp.
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eBay signaled its unwillingness to permit bots to trawl its site by
using “robot exclusion headers.” Many Internet businesses that rely on
information collected by bots to function, such as search engines,
program their bots to abide by restrictions placed by web site operators
in robot exclusion headers. Bidder’s Edge, by contrast, decided that it
could ignore the content of eBay’s robot exclusion headers with
impunity because the information it was collecting from eBay’s site was
simply factual, and thus unlikely to be protected by copyright. In
addition, because eBay’s business model dictated that as much
information as possible should be made publicly accessible on its site,
and only participation in actual purchases and sales should require
registration and the formation of a contract with eBay, Bidder’s Edge
could argue that the eBay User Agreement also did not apply.
eBay and Bidder’s Edge entered into license negotiations that would
have granted Bidder’s Edge permission to perform real time proxy
searches on behalf of its end users, but the negotiations were broken off
without agreement. eBay then began to use all technological means
available to it at the time to block Bidder’s Edge’s bots from accessing
its site, but without success. eBay next filed suit against Bidder’s Edge,
seeking an injunction to prevent Bidder’s Edge from sending
unauthorized bots onto eBay’s servers. The suit was based on various
theories including trespass to chattels, false advertising, federal and state
trademark dilution, computer fraud and abuse, unfair competition,
misappropriation, interference with prospective economic advantage,
and unjust enrichment. eBay was granted the injunction based on the
trespass to chattels argument, but the court did not reach the other
claims.21 Bidder’s Edge appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, but shut down its web site before the court heard oral
arguments.22 Shortly thereafter, Bidder’s Edge paid eBay an undisclosed
sum to settle the litigation.23
While the outcome in the eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc.24 case may
have resolved the conflict between those two parties, the district court’s
ruling established an overbroad precedent. The district court’s opinion
does not place any limits on eBay’s power to restrict access to its site

21. eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
22. Jahna Berry, Robots in the Hen House, THE RECORDER, July 24, 2001, at
http://www.law.com/regionals/ca/stories/edt0723_ip_robots.shtml.
23. Id.
24. 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
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that eBay offered to Bidder’s Edge in the failed license negotiations.
eBay was willing to grant Bidder’s Edge access to the information its
customers wanted in a way that guaranteed that Bidder’s Edge’s
customers were provided with only accurate price comparisons, but
Bidder’s Edge rejected the offer because it thought it could do better
without a license.
B.

Trespass to Chattels: Costs and Benefits

Applying the doctrine of trespass to chattels to the problem of
unauthorized access to Internet resources has several benefits. It
recognizes that most of the facilities that make up the Internet are now
owned and operated by private parties. These are not eleemosynary
institutions, and it is not their intention to donate their computers to the
public once they connect them to the Internet. The doctrine of trespass to
chattels also can be invoked if someone merely “intermeddles” with a
chattel, a concept that is sufficiently vague to be capable of expanding to
cover access to Internet resources. It puts the owner of the computer
equipment in the driver’s seat with regard to determining what access to
its equipment is acceptable and what is not.25 In the absence of such a
theory, owners of computer equipment would have to consider the
consequences of connecting their equipment to the Internet much more
carefully, and, in all likelihood, some businesses would make the
decision to withdraw their systems from full participation in the Internet
in order to maintain an acceptable level of control over their networks.
These benefits notwithstanding, trespass to chattels fails to provide an
adequate mechanism to balance the competing claims of Internet
resource providers and Internet resource users. Asking whether an
unauthorized electronic access to data stored in digital form on a server
is equivalent to an unauthorized use of a toothbrush does not provide a
rational basis for the development of the law in this area.26 The doctrine
of trespass to chattels was considered archaic and underdeveloped before

25. See Epstein, supra note 4.
26. The Restatement (Second) of Torts comments:
There may, however, be situations in which the value to the owner of a particular type of
chattel may be impaired by dealing with it in a manner that does not affect its physical
condition. Thus, the use of a toothbrush by someone else may lead a person of ordinary
sensibilities to regard the article as utterly incapable of further use by him, and the wearing of
an intimate article of clothing may reasonably destroy its value in his eyes. In such a case, the
intermeddling is actionable even though the physical condition of the chattel is not impaired.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 cmt. h (1965).

292

WINN_JANEFINAL

2/13/2004 6:29 PM

Crafting a License
its sudden burst of fame in the Internet context, and its application to
sophisticated computer technology is unlikely to produce profound
insights into the character of social relationships mediated by technology
and law. Unlike nuisance doctrine, it does not require the explicit
balancing of the competing public and private interests affected by the
regulation of Internet access, substituting a private, commercial
decision-making process for a more public, participatory process
characteristic of the Internet in its early days.27
Perhaps the most appropriate theory for granting eBay the relief it
sought against Bidder’s Edge, and in similar cases, might have been
some kind of a reverse passing off28 “cold news” variation of the “hot
news” misappropriation doctrine established in International News
Service v. Associated Press.29 In International News, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that a rival news service could not copy news stories and
resell the information even though the news stories lacked copyright
protection.30 The precise contours of misappropriation are somewhat
unclear, but it seems at a minimum to grant a “quasi-property right” to
the party claiming misappropriation, and to recognize the value of time
and effort spent creating something of economic value that is not
recognized by existing intellectual property law doctrines.
Although the holding in that case has been limited to its facts by
subsequent cases,31 those facts share a common characteristic with the
facts of the eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc. dispute because a large part
of the economic value of the commercial information in both cases was
determined by its “freshness.” In the eBay case, however, Bidder’s
Edge’s behavior might have driven eBay’s customers away, not because
they could get product of equal value from Bidder’s Edge, but because
the Bidder’s Edge business model involved serving up eBay prices over
eBay’s objection after they had become stale. Such a tenuous argument
27. See Burk, supra note 2.
28. Reverse passing off is the marketing of another’s product under a claim that it is one’s own;
passing off is marketing of one’s own product under another’s mark, i.e., trademark infringement.
See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, __ n.1, 123 S. Ct. 2041,
2045 n.1 (2003).
29. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
30. Id. at 219.
31. See, e.g., Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 843 (2d Cir. 1997); Cheney
Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929); Nat’l Football League v. Delaware, 435
F. Supp. 1372, 1377 (D. Del. 1977); cf. Bruce P. Keller, Condemned To Repeat the Past: The
Reemergence of Misappropriation and Other Common Law Theories of Protection for Intellectual
Property, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401 (1997).
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would have been unlikely to support a claim for a preliminary
injunction, however, leading eBay to emphasize its trespass claim as a
more solid basis for a grant of an injunction.
If the case had been decided on a misappropriation theory instead of a
trespass theory, the court might have articulated limits to eBay’s
discretion in deciding what type of access to grant visitors to its site. For
example, the doctrine of misappropriation prohibits competitors from
reusing information, but does not prohibit individuals in the general
public from reusing the same information.32 A holding based on a
misappropriation or deceptive trade practices theory might have
distinguished between prohibiting certain forms of access arising out of
unfair competition and preserving open access for other Internet users
not engaged in any form of unfair competition.
The controversy surrounding the appropriateness of applying trespass
doctrine to Internet access disputes is unlikely to subside any time soon,
nor is the inconsistency in the manner in which the doctrine has been
applied likely to be eliminated soon. While it remains possible that
Congress will act to resolve this turmoil by enacting legislation that
balances the competing public and private interests fairly, it is unlikely
that will happen in the near future. So both Internet site operators and
visitors will likely be left struggling to make sense of the emerging
jurisprudence of trespass to Internet facilities. Articulating more clearly
the significance of the decision by the owner of computer equipment to
connect it to the Internet may create a mechanism for establishing a
better balance of public and private interests, thus diffusing some of the
current controversy and providing greater predictability in the
application of trespass doctrine.
II.

A RIGHT TO EXCLUDE QUALIFIED BY A PRIVILEGE TO
ACCESS

The debate over whether trespass to chattels should be applied to
resolve disputes involving unauthorized Internet access grows more
acrimonious with passing time. On the one side are the “propertization”
advocates, arguing that property rights of owners of the computer
equipment at issue should trump other interests, giving the property
owners a unilateral right to veto any use of their equipment they do not
like.33 On the other side are the supporters of the idea of the Internet as
32. Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 236.
33. See Epstein, supra note 4.
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an open, public space where the community interest in preserving that
openness conditions the right of owners of computer equipment to
connect to the Internet on their acceptance of pre-existing Internet social
norms of openness.34
The degree to which the debate has become polarized is obvious from
this comment by Justice Brown in her dissent in Intel Corp. v. Hamidi35:
“Those who have contempt for grubby commerce and reverence for the
rarified heights of intellectual discourse may applaud today’s decision,
but even the flow of ideas will be curtailed if the right to exclude is
denied.”36 But the debate need not be so polarized. The attempt to frame
each position in absolute terms distorts each argument and obscures a
possible middle ground where the competing claims of equipment owner
and Internet end user might be harmonized.
Recasting the arguments using Hohfeldian terminology of rights can
help clarify this middle ground.37 Hohfeld suggested his system for
classifying different forms of legal relations to show when apparent
conflicts among different legal interests were misleading.38 In the case of
unauthorized access to Internet sites, vindicating the property rights of
equipment owners negates any possible right Internet site visitors might
have to free and open access to information posted on the Internet.
Vindicating the public interest in freely making use of information
posted on the Internet negates any right of the equipment owner to
exclude others from its equipment. While each side would like to claim a
strong form of rights in support of its position, it may be more accurate
to say that equipment owners have certain limited property rights
bundled together with certain privileges and powers, while the end users
clearly could also be found to have a privilege of access that the
equipment owner must respect. Recasting the debate in these terms is
merely a first step toward resolving the controversy, because even if
equipment owners are prepared to concede that end users enjoy an
34. See Burk, supra note 2; Ruth L. Okediji, Trading Posts in Cyberspace: Information Markets
and the Construction of Proprietary Rights, 44 B.C. L. REV. 545 (2003); O’Rourke, Shaping
Competition, supra note 2.
35. 71 P.3d 296, 325 (Cal. 2003) (J. Brown, dissenting).
36. Id. at 325 (J. Brown, dissenting).
37. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913); see also WILLIAM A. EDMUNDSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO
RIGHTS, ch. V, at 149 (Cambridge University Press ed., forthcoming 2004); Alon Harel, Theories of
Rights, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY (Martin P.
Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., forthcoming 2004).
38. Hohfeld, supra note 37, at 18.
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implied license to access public Internet sites, the scope of that license
remains to be defined.
A.

Right to Exclude

Property rights in tangible computer equipment should not be
conflated with a much broader right to exclude Internet users from
accessing information on public web sites. If web site operators have a
right to exclude end users, then end users have a corresponding duty not
to interfere with the web site operator’s exercise of its right. This is
because, using Hohfeld’s taxonomy, “duty” is the jural correlative of
“right.”39 But assigning strong rights and correlative strict duties in this
manner is at odds with the reality of Internet use by both web site
operators and end users. Web site operators connect their systems to the
Internet precisely in order to avail themselves of the public character of
the network for commercial advantage. If web site operators are
concerned about controlling access to their equipment, then such control
can be accomplished by technological means—albeit at a cost of reduced
traffic to a site.40 For example, eBay permits casual visitors to look at
auctions without registering, but will only permit registered “members of
its community” to actually participate in actions as buyers or sellers. In
order to join the community, individuals are required to complete a
series of web forms and click through a contracting interface, agreeing to
be bound by eBay’s User Agreement. Registered users have user IDs
and passwords that they must use to participate in auctions. User IDs and
passwords with little or no verification of the information provided is a
very rudimentary form of access control. If eBay required more security,
it could use other networking technologies such as “virtual private
networks.”41
When commercial parties choose to connect their computer
equipment to the Internet without restricting access to that equipment
through the use of technological access controls, they are choosing to
participate in a public forum. The Internet’s public character was

39. See EDMUNDSON, supra note 37, at 154; Hohfeld, supra note 37, at 30.
40. Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in Computer
Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596 (2003) (statutes criminalizing unauthorized computer
access should be interpreted as requiring the circumvention of a technological barrier to access
rather than violating a contractual limitation on access).
41. See, e.g., RITA C. SUMMERS, SECURE COMPUTING: THREATS AND SAFEGUARDS 353–58
(1997).
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established long before commercial exploitation of the Internet was
permitted. Prior to 1995, the National Science Foundation Acceptable
Use Policy (AUP) applied to Internet activity, and prohibited
commercial use unless the National Science Foundation (NSF) reviewed
the use for consistency with its overall mission and granted permission
for it.42 At that time, the purpose of the Internet was “to support research
and education in and among academic institutions in the U.S. by
providing access to unique resources and the opportunity for
collaborative work.”43 As Kesan and Shah explain:
The NSFNET (later known as the Internet) connected
universities, federal agencies, public and private research
laboratories, and community networks. While the NSFNET
encouraged such diversity, it also had an Acceptable Use Policy
(AUP). The AUP prohibited the use of the NSFNET for
purposes not in support of research and education, a policy
consistent with the NSF’s mission. Nevertheless, a growing
number of users wished to use NSFNET for purposes beyond
research and education, a push for what the NSF termed
“commercial use.” The potential for commercial use of the
Internet propelled regional networks to create for-profit spinoffs. These for-profit commercial networks would eventually
form the basis for the privatized Internet backbone.44
So the first commercial uses of the Internet were possible because the
NSF granted immunity from expulsion to for-profit entities that joined
the Internet. Under that immunity, the number of for-profit service
providers grew until 1995, when the NSF was able to withdraw its
support for the Internet backbone and turn it over to private parties to
operate.
Equipment owners that once accepted a mere immunity from
expulsion in order to share in the benefits of Internet access are now
trying to turn the tables on other Internet users and claim a right to
exclude other Internet users at will. But this is too broad a claim of right:

42. National Science Foundation, Acceptable Use Policy (July 3, 1990), available at
http://www.eff.org/Net_culture/Net_info/Technical/Policy/nsfnet_policy.old.
43. Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Fool Us Once Shame on You—Fool Us Twice Shame on Us:
What We Can Learn from the Privatizations of the Internet Backbone Network and the Domain
Name System, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 89, 112 (2001).
44. Id. at 111 (citing BRIAN KAHIN, The NREN as Information Market: Dynamics of Public,
Private, and Academic Publishing, in BUILDING INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 323–24 (Brian
Kahin ed., 1993)).
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a narrower claim of right that recognizes a privilege of access for
ordinary end users is adequate to protect the equipment owner from
unfair competition and hostile intrusions to their equipment that interfere
with their commercial activities. A narrower claim of right more fairly
balances the interests of equipment owners and ordinary end users by
permitting web site operators only to restrict access by other commercial
parties, not access by individual end users. Some form of implied license
for individual end users must be recognized to prevent the destruction of
the open, public character of the Internet in the name of commerce.
Granting web site operators a power to exclude other commercial
actors from overbroad access to their sites, in lieu of a stronger right to
exclude anyone from accessing their sites for any reason, assigns a
realistic and appropriate significance to the equipment owner’s free
choice to connect its equipment to an open, public communications
medium. In Hohfeldian terms, to say that someone has a power is not to
say that anyone else has a duty; rather, someone else might incur a duty
if the power is exercised.45 Giving web site operators a power to fend off
potential competitors permits them sufficient control over their
equipment to protect its commercial value without depriving the general
public of its ability to enjoy freely the open character of the Internet. If
web site operators want to restrict access to their sites by the general
public, then they can take concrete steps to restrict access to information
on servers attached to the Internet, for example, by putting the
information behind a firewall and implementing technological access
controls. Many commercial web site operators, such as eBay, are
unwilling to place these kinds of restrictions on casual visitors to its site,
but do place these restrictions on anyone who would proceed from
merely viewing information to transaction processing. The business
decision regarding the design and implementation of access controls to
Internet facilities should be assigned a legal significance in any
subsequent dispute over whether a particular form of access was
authorized.
B.

Right to Access

Even the most vigorous opponents of the application of trespass to
chattels to the issue of Internet access have not argued that Internet end

45. See EDMUNDSON, supra note 37, at 155.
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users have a “right to access” Internet facilities.46 Such a strong claim
would imply that equipment owners have a duty to maintain the
equipment so that end users’ rights can be exercised.47 Instead,
opponents argue that end users should receive a broad grant of immunity
from liability as a consequence of the equipment owner having made the
decision to connect to the Internet. In the eBay case, this immunity
would have prevented eBay from getting an injunction to stop Bidder’s
Edge’s bots from copying and transmitting large quantities of
information accessible on eBay’s site before the court reached a
judgment on the merits.
A commercial entity such as Bidder’s Edge cannot claim that the type
of access for which it demands immunity was an integral part of the
public character of the Internet that eBay knowingly embraced. As early
as 1994, a standard for robot exclusion was being developed informally
to permit web site operators to communicate their desire to exclude
software robots from their sites.48 Bidder’s Edge’s decision to send bots
to copy and transmit data from eBay’s site for commercial exploitation
on Bidder’s Edge’s site bears no resemblance to the types of access that
would have been permitted under the NSF’s AUP. By contrast, the terms
of the license that eBay offered Bidder’s Edge and that Bidder’s Edge
rejected bore a close resemblance to the types of access that would have
been permitted under the NSF’s AUP. Bidder’s Edge rejected eBay’s
“reasonable access” license, however, and instead gambled on an
aggressive claim that because it had the right to make unrestricted
commercial use of the factual information on eBay’s computers, eBay
had no right to restrict its access to eBay’s servers.
C.

Privilege to Access from Constructive Consent

Consent may create a defense to a claim of tort liability by creating a
privilege to engage in the conduct in question.49 An end user has a
plausible claim that any web site operator who has not articulated an
46. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation, Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71
P.3d
296
(Cal.
2003)
(No.
S103781),
available
at
http://www.eff.org/Spam_cybersquatting_abuse/Spam/Intel_v_Hamidi/intel_v_hamidi_amicus.pdf;
Burk, supra note 2; O’Rourke, Shaping Competition, supra note 2.
47. “[Hamidi] does not argue that he has a right to force unwanted messages on Intel.” Intel Corp.
v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 318 (Cal. 2003).
48. See, e.g., Martijn Koster, A Standard for Robot Exclusion (Jun. 30, 1994), available at
http://www.robotstxt.org/wc/norobots.html.
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 890 cmt. b (1965).
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express policy governing access to its site has impliedly consented to
any reasonable, conventional form of Internet access. However, this
implied license alone cannot support the creation of a robust privilege of
access for individual end users because a web site operator can revoke
any implied consent at any time by notifying visitors that it has
established a restrictive access policy.
The only way to create a robust privilege of access for the general
public is to find constructive consent to access web sites based on a web
site operator’s choice to join the Internet without placing any functional
restrictions on access to its site. Constructive consent is not a finding
that consent exists as a factual matter, but rather is a legal fiction that
asserts that something tantamount to consent does exist, and that it will
be given the same legal effect as consent. While courts are often willing
to find consent implied in light of parties’ behavior in a given context,
they are generally reluctant to invoke the notion of constructive consent
without an extraordinary justification.50 This general reluctance
notwithstanding, a finding of constructive consent can be used to
balance competing public policy objectives.51 Here, the competing
policy objectives are the need to allow web site operators to protect
themselves against interference, and the public’s need for open access to
web sites. The notion of constructive consent shifts the obligation from
the individual end user to ensure that his or her access is permitted to the
web site operator to choose between granting the general public
reasonable but unfettered access to its site and placing some form of
functional access controls on its site.
In order to strike an appropriate balance between the interests of
individual end users in preserving the public character of the Internet
and the interests of commercial web site operators in preserving and
exploiting the value of the equipment they have connected to the
Internet, the notion of constructive consent must be limited to those
situations where the public interest in unrestricted access is clear. The
NSF’s AUP provides a convenient starting point for the process of
defining what “reasonable” individual access or its functional equivalent
would be. But because AUP ceased to apply to Internet activities nearly
a decade ago, it would be anachronistic to adhere too closely to its terms

50. See, e.g., In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 19–20 (1st Cir. 2003); GriggsRyan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 117 (1st Cir. 1990).
51. See, e.g., Murdza v. Zimmerman, 786 N.E.2d 440, 442–43 (2003).
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in the search for a definition of access to Internet facilities so reasonable,
it should always be privileged.
Requiring a finding that machine functions were neither actually
impaired nor likely to be impaired as a result of wide replication of the
offending form of access, as the California Supreme Court did in
Hamidi, is an important element in recognizing a privilege to access
public Internet facilities, but by itself is not a complete protection for
that privilege. The focus of a court’s analysis should be on the intent of
commercial operators of computer equipment in making the decision to
connect their facilities to the Internet, not on the impact that access has
on machine functions. Focusing on intent and the social significance of
the public character of the Internet creates a framework within which a
privilege to access Internet resources can evolve with technological
change while remaining consistent to its objectives.
III. RECENT TRESPASS CASES
The holdings of recent cases applying the doctrine of trespass to
chattels to Internet access disputes veer from finding no privilege to
access Internet sites to finding immunity from liability for clearly
unauthorized access.52 If Internet facility operators, by connecting their
equipment to the Internet without technological access controls, are
deemed to have consented to the technological equivalent of individual
access, can this notion of constructive consent help to make sense of
recent trespass cases that otherwise seem to veer back and forth between
contradictory interpretations? As the following analysis makes clear, the
privilege of reasonable access for individual Internet users or its
functional equivalent unfortunately is not a silver bullet that magically
resolves all the overbreadth problems inherent in applying trespass to
Internet access disputes. It may nevertheless help to focus attention on
which characteristics of the Internet commercial parties should be
required to tolerate, however grudgingly, as a condition of maintaining
an open connection between their equipment and the Internet.

52. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV99-7654-HLH (VBKx), 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6483 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (finding immunity from liability); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc.,
126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058
(N.D. Cal. 2000); CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio
1997); Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003); Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001), rev’d, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003) (finding no privilege).
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Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc.

In Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc,53 a domain name registrar used
trespass to chattels to stop unauthorized access to its site by a
competitor. Although Register.com was required by its Registrar
Accreditation Agreement (RAA) with the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) to permit the use of domain
name registration data for any lawful purpose, it was not permitted to
allow the use of that data to enable the transmission of mass, unsolicited,
commercial email (spam). Register.com worked with business partners
to provide web hosting and other Internet services to its domain name
registration customers. Verio, a provider of web hosting and other
Internet services, used a software robot to collect information about
recently registered domain names and then contacted the individuals
who had registered them to offer them various Internet services. The
manner in which Verio contacted Register.com customers was
calculated to cause Register.com customers to believe Verio was, at a
minimum, a business partner of Register.com when in fact it was a
competitor. After Register.com learned, through complaints from its
customers and business partners, that Verio was soliciting its customers
in this manner, it demanded that Verio stop making such solicitations.
When Verio would not agree to cease the solicitations, Register.com
sought an injunction to stop Verio, pleading trespass to chattels, breach
of contract, unfair competition, and unauthorized access under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. The court issued a preliminary
injunction based on a finding that Register.com was likely to prevail on
both the trespass to chattels and computer fraud claims.
The holding in Register.com has been controversial because the court
did not require a showing that Verio’s unauthorized access was actually
interfering with the functioning of Register.com’s equipment. Instead,
the court accepted Register.com’s argument that if Verio was allowed to
continue this type of unauthorized access, the floodgates would open and
there would be no end to the other companies using the same technique
to harvest data from Register.com’s system, at which point the
functioning of its equipment would be impaired.
If the court had used the constructive consent approach, the terms of
the RAA, which required Register.com to provide public access to its
data except under two limited circumstances, might have provided

53. 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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evidence of what access Register.com could be deemed to have
consented. Instead, because Verio had no rights as a third-party
beneficiary under the RAA, the court rejected evidence that
Register.com’s terms of use of its data were more restrictive than the
RAA permitted.54 However, subsequent to the Register.com lawsuit,
ICANN revised the terms of the RAA, requiring domain name registrars
not to give access to data for “transmission by e-mail, telephone, or
facsimile of mass, unsolicited, commercial advertising or solicitations to
entities other than the data recipient’s own existing customers.”55 This
revised RAA closely resembles the Register.com terms in effect at the
time of Verio’s unauthorized access, indicating that Register.com’s
terms of use were not unreasonable even if they did not conform to its
obligations under the version of the RAA in effect at the time of the
litigation. If the later standard of acceptable use of Register.com data
was used as the standard by which constructive consent should be
measured, then Verio’s conduct would not have been privileged after all.
B.

Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc.

Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc.56 considered the application of
trespass doctrine to the problem of one commercial site linking to
another without permission.57 Ticketmaster is the largest company
selling tickets to sporting and other entertainment events, and has both
online and bricks-and-mortar operations; Tickets.com is one of its
competitors, operating primarily online. Tickets.com provided visitors to
its own web site information about events for which Ticketmaster was
the exclusive sales agent by providing “deep links” into Ticketmaster’s
web site. These deep links permitted Tickets.com’s visitors to avoid
Ticketmaster’s home page and directly access information about a
particular event located deep within Ticketmaster’s web site. In 2000,
Ticketmaster unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction to stop
Tickets.com from providing deep links into its site, claiming breach of

54. Id. at 248 (stating that the RAA expressly provided that no third party beneficiaries would be
created by its terms).
55. Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers Registrar Accreditation Agreement
(ICAAN RAA) § 3.3.5 (May 17, 2001), available at http://www.icann.org/registrars/ra-agreement17may01.htm.
56. No. CV99-7654-HLH (VBKx), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6483 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
57. Id.
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contract, copyright infringement, trespass to chattels, false advertising,
and trademark infringement.58
In 2003, the same court granted summary judgment to Tickets.com on
Ticketmaster’s trespass to chattels and copyright claims, but denied
summary judgment on the breach of contract claims.59 Tickets.com sent
a software robot onto the Ticketmaster web site to copy information
about events, then discarded information such as logos, advertisements,
and formatting, keeping only the factual information describing the
events. The court rejected the idea that any unauthorized access by a
software robot could give rise to liability for trespass when no
impairment of the function of the equipment had been shown.
The notion of constructive consent would point toward the same
result here because hypertext is one of the defining characteristics of the
World Wide Web. The court found that Ticketmaster had not shown that
it had suffered any damages, such as loss of advertising revenues, as a
result of the deep links created by Tickets.com. While the holding in the
case was based on the inability of Ticketmaster to make out any trespass
claim at all based on failure to prove the element of damages, the lack of
damages also supports a finding that the access by Tickets.com through
deep linking was the functional equivalent of reasonable access by an
individual user. Ticketmaster wanted anyone interested in events for
which it was the exclusive agent to access its site from its home page,
but when the original dispute arose in 1999, it had not implemented any
access controls that would have required individual visitors to follow
such a route.
C.

Intel Corp. v. Hamidi

In Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, a disgruntled former employee used the
Internet to criticize his erstwhile employer by sending emails to current
Intel employees and by building a web site to disseminate his anti-Intel
opinions on the World Wide Web.60 After someone provided him with
an electronic copy of Intel’s employee directory, Hamidi sent emails on
58. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV99-7654-HLH (BQRx), 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12987 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
59. Ticketmaster Corp., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6483, at *2 (finding immunity from liability). In
2000, the trial court found that Ticketmaster was unlikely to prevail on its breach of contract claim,
but after additional discovery turned up new evidence that Tickets.com may have entered into a
contract with Ticketmaster over the Internet the court in 2003 refused to enter summary judgment in
favor of Tickets.com.
60. 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003).
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six occasions to anywhere from 8,000 to 35,000 employees, or a total of
between 48,000 and 210,000 emails in all.61 Hamidi’s messages
promised to remove recipients from the mailing list upon request, and he
apparently complied with all such requests that he received.62 Intel,
however, was unwilling to wait for its employees to make such requests
or simply to delete Hamidi’s emails from their inboxes, and so
demanded that Hamidi stop sending critical emails to its current
employees.63 At trial and on appeal,64 Intel’s request for an injunction
was granted based on a trespass to chattels theory, notwithstanding the
lack of a showing of any significant impairment of Intel’s system’s
functioning. The California Supreme Court took a different view of
trespass doctrine, and held that because there was no significant
impairment of Intel’s system’s functioning, and because there was no
indication that a flood of other former disgruntled employees were
waiting to deluge it with emails, Hamidi was immune from liability
under trespass doctrine.65
In determining whether Intel should be deemed to have consented to
Hamidi’s use of its equipment to send emails to its current employees,
notwithstanding its vociferous objections, a crucial factor would seem to
be the non-commercial character of Hamidi’s communication. Although
the California Supreme Court did not reach the issue of whether
enforcement of a state law that interfered with Hamidi’s exercise of his
free speech rights would constitute impermissible state action under the
First Amendment, unlike the Register.com and Ticketmaster cases,
Hamidi was not a competitor of Intel, and his behavior did not raise
unfair competition issues. On the other hand, if constructive consent
creates a privilege for reasonable individual access of Internet facilities,
it is unclear whether sending 48,000 to 210,000 emails constitutes
reasonable individual use. A final factor suggesting that Intel should be
deemed to have constructively consented to Hamidi’s sending emails to
its current employees is its failure to implement more effective and
restrictive access controls. By granting its employees relatively free
access to the Internet, Intel arguably entered into a public arena within

61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), rev’d, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal.
2003).
65. Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 311.
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which it could be expected to tolerate the criticism of ex-employees such
as Hamidi, at least in the absence of any showing that Hamidi’s
communications were impairing the function of its systems.
IV. CONCLUSION
The public character of the Internet can be protected by assigning a
legal significance to decisions by commercial Internet users about how
to make use of Internet technologies. Individual users of the Internet
should have a license to access what is posted on the Internet that cannot
be negated by arbitrary assertions of rights over information rooted in
ownership of tangible computer equipment. Because the free flow of
information has been a hallmark both of civil society and the Internet,
that association between civil liberties and the institutional character of
the Internet should be preserved notwithstanding the growing
commercialization of Internet resources. Granting individual users a
privilege to access information on the Internet in a reasonable manner
would preserve the basic character of that association while still
recognizing that the Internet is now sustained by private investment in
computer equipment. Access by anyone other than individuals in a
manner that approximated individual access would likewise be covered
by an implied license created by constructive consent, but consent to
access that differs in quality or quantity from that associated with
individual users could be withdrawn. This license to access information
would be in effect a privilege implied by law that limits the property
rights of the owners of the equipment. Using the common law to
articulate the scope of constructive consent to access by Internet users,
and the privilege it creates, would help to clarify the social significance
of the Internet itself and establish viable standards to safeguard its open,
participatory character.
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